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The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was founded in the 1950s with price support as the main policy 
instrument. Despite massive criticism from both within and outside the EU, price support remains the 
backbone of the CAP. This paper argues that the choice of price support was logical viewed in both  
historical and economical perspectives, and gives three reasons for this. First, even though talks on 
agricultural integration began immediately after the war, the CAP was a result of general economic 
integration in Europe rather than the reason for it. Second, the structure of the CAP was determined by 
the agricultural policies of the six founding countries. The third and last reason is related to the economic 
characteristics of running a price support system. The six countries together were net importers of 
agricultural products  and could thereby benefit from import levies. Price support is paid for by the 
consumers, and European consumers had been paying high prices for food for a long time. This, together 
with a high level of economic growth in Europe in the 1960s, made it easier for the governments to 
choose this policy rather than a policy based on direct payments financed by taxpayers that would have 
put pressure on the national fiscal budgets of the six countries. 
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1. Introduction 
From its inception, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been under pressure 
from many sides (Fennell, 1973). The main argument against the CAP has been the 
choice of price support as the main policy instrument. Various groups within the 
European Community have often argued that only slowly if ever will price support 
result in a situation where all the objectives of the CAP stated in article 39 in the Treaty 
of Rome were achieved. In addition to price support being a bad choice of instrument 
for achieving the objectives,  the CAP creates transaction costs,  distortionary costs and 
negative spill-over effects for the rest of the Community. Various groups outside the 
European Community have argued that price support not only creates problems within 
the Community but also creates distortionary costs and negative spill-over effects for 
countries outside the Community and the world economy as a whole. Despite reforms of 
the CAP over the years and trade agreements between The European Union (EU) and 
the rest of the world where the overall trend has been a move from price support to  2
direct payments (from coupled to decoupled support), price support is still one of the 
backbones of agricultural policy in Europe to day (OECD, 2000a pp.70-82 ).  
  This paper aims to establish a framework within which the CAP can be 
understood  and thereby shed light on why the CAP was founded with price support as 
the main policy instrument. The basic idea is that this framework should help us 
understand why long term changes in both the European economy and the place of 
agriculture in relation to the economy as a whole have not resulted in a more radical 
change in the CAP in the same way that other European institutions have evolved over 
the years. 
  After a short overview of the agricultural situation in some key European 
countries, section 2 discusses the connection between general economic integration and 
the integration of agricultural policy in Europe. Section 3 deals with the early 
development of the CAP. Section 4 presents an overview of agricultural policy in 
Europe before the CAP. Section 5 gives an analysis of the economic theory foundation 
of the CAP with respect to the income problem in agriculture and the need to ensure 
secure supplies of food, and presents the economic characteristics of a price support 
system. The conclusion is in section 6. 
 
2. European Economic Integration and Agriculture 
Before we turn to European integration, some agricultural indicators for key European 
countries are presented in table 1. The message is clear. Agriculture played a major role 
in the economy of the six founding countries of the EEC in relation to overall 
production, employment, and trade. The last column of table 1 illustrates the fact that 
Holland was the only member of the EEC (6) with a positive net foreign trade balance 
in agricultural products in the period 1955-59. The indicators for the UK, another key 
player in the discussion of integration in the late 1940s and 1950s, show the minor role 
of agriculture in the overall economy and demonstrate that the UK was truly a net 
importer of agricultural products. 
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a) In the last three columns, the trade data for Luxembourg are included in the data for Belgium.   
Source: OECD (1969) 
 
Discussions on the integration of agricultural policy in Europe began immediately after  3
the Second World War had ended. Talks took place in The Council of Europe and the 
OEEC (Organization for European Economic Co-operation) between seventeen nations, 
based on proposals from France, Britain and The Netherlands. In broad terms one can 
say that there were two important issues in agricultural policy. The first was to ensure 
the security of food supplies, and the second was the question of security of income for 
farmers. The former had many aspects. Production was low because of the war, and it 
was essential to raise productivity and production for three reasons. People were 
suffering as result of a decline in food consumption (Foreman-Peck, 1983 p. 270), a 
high level of dependency on food imports was seen as political weakness, and finally 
foreign currency and especially dollars were a scarce resource (Hoffmeyer, 1958). The 
second issue of farmer´s incomes was also of great importance, because empirical 
studies showed that farm incomes were lagging behind incomes in other sectors 
(OECD, 1961). The negotiations failed to reach any agreement. The differences 
between  France and the Dutch on one side, arguing for a supranational policy and 
strong community preferences, and the British on the other side, opposing any form of 
supranationalism and with a strong will to maintain relations with the Commonwealth, 
doomed the talks from the beginning (Tracy, 1982). These negotiations on creating a 
common policy for agriculture took place between 1952 and 1954 without any 
agreement being reached. According to Fearne (1997), the discussions and the final 
breakdown of the talks served to identify the differences between the European 
countries, at least in relation to agriculture (Fearne, 1997 p. 12). In 1955 the Ministerial 
Committee for Agriculture and Food was founded under the OEEC with the purpose of 
using the differences that had been identified in further talks that could lead to reforms 
and harmonizations of agricultural policy in OEEC member countries (Ingersent & 
Rayner, 1999 p.149).       
  After the breakdown of negotiations in 1954 it was evident that some countries 
shared the same visions of a single market in Europe, a market that also included 
agriculture. Talks began between the six countries France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Belgium and Luxembourg on further economic integration. These six countries had 
participated in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)  since 1951, and this 
experience, together with the experiences from the Benelux Union, served as the 
foundation of the discussions at a conference in Mesina, Italy in June 1955. The 
concluding report from Mesina laid the ground for the European Economic Community 
(EEC). Agriculture was only one issue out of many, but in the chapter concerning 
agriculture in the Spark Report it was stated that the establishment of a common market 
without agriculture was unthinkable (Fearne,1997 p. 14). According to Mansholt 
(1963), there were at least four good reasons for including agriculture in the economic 
integration process in Western Europe. First, there was a practical difficulty in 
excluding agriculture from being a part of an integrated market because in practice it 
was not possible to draw a clear line between agricultural and industrial products. 
Second, agriculture played a major role in the economies of the six countries, and in 
particular the shares of total exports and imports represented by agriculture were of 
great importance (see table 1). Third, the level and the fluctuations of food prices in a 
national economy are significantly influenced by agricultural markets and agricultural 
policy, and are therefore an essential cost factor in the non-agricultural sector. The 
fourth and last reason for including agriculture in the integration process was that 
changes and adjustments in the agricultural sector are essential in connection with 
general economic growth (Mansholt, 1963 pp. 83-89). 
  The agenda for the six countries was clear: agriculture should be part of  4
European integration. But it was also clear after almost 10 years of negotiations in the 
Council of Europe and the OEEC and after Mesina that the actual design of a common 
policy would be very difficult to agree upon. On January 1st, 1958 the Treaty of Rome 
between the six countries came into force and the EEC became reality. Agriculture was 
included in the Treaty in very broad terms. The main reason for this solution was the 
eagerness of the six countries to ensure peace and stability in Europe by signing the 
treaty. They were not interested in being held up by discussions of complicated 
agricultural policy issues, or indeed other specific policy issues for that matter. The 
basic consequence of this was that the common agricultural policy had to be designed in 
such a way that it could be implemented through already existing European economic 
institutions. In other words, the Treaty of Rome not only pressured the decision makers 
to agree on a common policy, but also put on constraints in relation to time limits and 
design. 
 
3. The birth and development of the CAP
1 
With the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the establishment of the EEC on 
January 1st, 1958, the common agricultural policy came into being. Agriculture was 
covered in articles 38 to 47 of the treaty, but there were no specific guidelines for an 
operational policy. Article 39 of the Treaty specifies a set of objectives for the Common 
Agricultural Policy. The policy seeks: 
 
                                                           
13) This paper can only give a short overview of the Common Agricultural Policy. For a more detailed 
description of this complex policy see Ritson & Harvey (1997) or Tracy (1996). For the complete story of 
the historical events see Fearne (1997) or Fennel (1997).   
a.  to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by 
ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum 
utilization of the factors of production, in particular labor; 
b.  thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community in 
particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in 
agriculture; 
c.  to stabilize markets; 
d.  to ensure the availability of supplies; 
e.  to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 
 
Other important points are stated in articles 40 and 43. Article 40 says that the common 
agricultural policy should be implemented in stages during a five-year transition period 
starting in 1962. Article 43 places the responsibility for designing the actual policy with 
the Commission, and the explicit deadline set is two years.  5
 As  mentioned  earlier,  the  real discussion of the design of the CAP began after 
the EEC was established. In the summer of 1958, delegations including politicians, civil 
servants and representatives of farm and food industry organizations from the six 
member countries met with the new Commission in Stresa, Italy to outline the problems 
that were facing agriculture in Europe and the means by which they could be resolved 
(Tracy, 1994). The conclusions drawn at Stresa can be summarized as follows. First, 
agriculture should continue to be a part of the overall general economic strategy of the 
Community. Second, intra-Community trade in agricultural products should be 
protected against distortions from the world market. Third, a system of market 
organization based on price support should be designed which, working in close relation 
to structural policy measures, could ensure the optimal use of production factors. 
Fourth, the family farm should be the cornerstone of European agriculture; and finally 
and fifth, it was believed that price support in connection with structural policy would 
maintain farmers’ income relative to other groups in the economy (Fearne, 1997 p. 16). 
According to Tracy (1994) and Fearne (1997), the crucial issue at Stresa was structural 
policy. The Commission pointed out again and again that price support without any 
form of structural policy would never result in the achievement of the most important 
objective concerning farmers’ income
2. It was also argued that the policy would create a 
wide range of problems for the Community in the long run. The delegations from the 
various countries had differing views about this, because of the different structures and 
organizations of farms (Tracy, 1994; Fearne 1997 p 16-17). In 1960 the Commission 
presented the proposal for the CAP (European Commission, 1960). The proposal 
included the following three principles for the common policy:  
 
                                                           
24) Even though it is not very clear for the period around the creation of the CAP, it becomes obvious in 
1968, when the Commission presented a proposal for the missing structural policy (European 
Commission, 1968), that the Commission were very much under influence of the early economic 
literature dealing with the farm problem approach mentioned in section 1. For an analysis see Zobbe 
(2001).   
 
a.  free intra-community trade: no barriers to trade in agricultural products 
between the member states; 
b.  Community preference: suppliers from within the Community were to be given 
preference in the market over those from outside the Community; 
c.  common financing: funding for the CAP would be through a European budget 
for all revenues and expenditures generated by the policy. 
 
The proposal was implemented, more or less, in the course of the 1960s. A tariff union 
was created to ensure a common market based on free trade for agricultural products 
between the six countries. All agricultural products were given their own market 
organizations with institutional prices. The market price on the internal market was to 
be stabilized through a system of intervention. In order to maintain the (high) prices at 
all times, the market organizations were combined with  a system of variable import 
levies and export restitutions. In connection with this system, a Community preference 
was introduced to further protect the farmers in the six countries. The principle of 
common financing meant that all costs and benefits of the CAP were a matter of  6
common interest and were to be handled through the Community budget. After a period 
of transition, the CAP was fully implemented in the late 1960s.   
  Another CAP issue, structural policy, became the responsibility of the national 
governments after similarly difficult negotiations. In this area, the political will to reach 
a compromise was hard to find. The only constraint that was put on structural policy 
committed the member countries to co-ordinate national structural policy on a 
Community level. The Commission would not accept this. They persisted in the idea 
that a common structural policy working together with price support was the ideal 
solution. In 1968 they presented a proposal for a structural policy reform of the CAP in 
COM (68) 1000 (European Commission, 1968).The aims of the policy were to 
implement measures that could ease structural adjustment in European agriculture, 
firstly by helping farmers to withdraw from agriculture through finding alternative 
occupations or taking early retirement, and secondly by reducing the quantities of farms, 
land and dairy cows in the agricultural sector in an effort to decrease overall production. 
However, European farmers and key politicians in the majority of EEC member 
countries were not ready for structural policy reforms in the 1960s. According to Tracy 
(1976), the proposal provoked violent opposition in farming circles throughout the 
Community. The opposition was concentrated around the proposals for reducing 
amounts of agricultural labor and agricultural land, and the overall suggestion that the 
creation of large farm units should be the solution to Europe’s agricultural problems 
(Tracy, 1976 p. 14). A watered-down version of the plan came into force in 1972, but 
because of the economic recession in Europe it made only a small impact (Tracy, 1984 
p. 310-311). 
 
4. Agricultural Policy in Europe before the CAP 
Agricultural policies in the 1950s in the founding nations of the CAP naturally played a 
major role in the process of designing a common policy (Munk, 1994 pp. 112-113; 
Fearne, 1997 pp. 21-33; Ingersent & Rayner, 1999 p. 152). Policy objectives and 
instruments in the six countries are summarized in table 2. The objectives of the 
agricultural policies in the six countries were very similar, since they all covered 
production and income. The term structural policy covers various types of measures. 
According to OEEC (1956), the main type of farm in Europe at that time was a fairly 
small-scale family-owned farm which had structural problems to a greater or lesser 
extent. In Italy and Germany the rural infrastructure had been damaged by the war, and 
in the other countries there were also indications of a long period of neglect of the 
infrastructure. Another reason for different structural policy approaches was the 
different patterns of economic development among the six countries (Tracy, 1982 pp. 5-
17). Increased production through increased productivity was seen as the solution to the 
farmers’ income problem, and in all six countries a  price policy combined with 
different structural policy measures was chosen as the way to obtain this goal. In 
Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg  the policy was implemented through 
market organizations for the main products, with governments intervening in the market 
to obtain a higher price than the world market price. In the Netherlands the government 
only intervened in the market to maintain stable prices. In Italy there was no explicit 
price policy, though there was an implicit one, in that the state controlled all the trade in 
agricultural products. When one reads in the literature (OEEC,1956, 1957 and 1958) 
about the policies of the time in the six countries, it is easy to see how a CAP based on 
price support as the main instrument must have looked extremely simple to the 
decision-makers in the early 1960s.   7
  The historical foundation of agricultural policies in the six countries went back 
to the arrival of cheap overseas grain that flooded Western Europe in the 1880s. The 
various European countries responded differently to this supply shock; this was for two 
reasons, according to O’Rourke (1997). First, the cheap grain generated different price 
shocks in grain-exporting and grain-importing countries; and second, even identical 
price shocks would have had different effects on  income distribution in different 
countries, due to the different roles played by grain production and agriculture in the 
general economies of these countries (O’Rourke, 1997 pp.798-799). The theoretical 
rationale for this is a simple textbook sector-specific factor model that assumes two 
sectors, Agriculture and Industry. Agriculture produces food using land and labor. 
Industry produces manufactured goods using capital and labor. Food is an import good, 
and manufactured items are an export good. Labor is mobile between sectors, and land 
and capital is immobile between sectors. The impact of cheap overseas grain in this 
model causes a drop in the grain price, which leads to a reduction of the labor force in 
agriculture. The workers migrate to the towns, nominal wages fall and Industry 
expands. The income distribution consequences of this are clear: owners of capital gain 
and owners of land lose. The obvious policy implication, according to O’Rourke (1997), 
was that landowners in the 1880s should favor agricultural tariffs and capital owners 
should favor free trade (O´Rourke, 1997). 
 
Table 2. The situation of agricultural policy in member countries before membership of the CAP 
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wealth. Price stability.   
(High)price policy and import controls. 
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organization with import controls and 
export subsidies. 
 
(High)price policy combined with 




State engaged in both domestic and 
international trade. Structural policy in a 
broad sense including credit facilities for 
all farmers but specially those in the 
south.  
 
(High) price policy (certain price levels 
could not be exceeded) through market 
organization with import controls. 
Structural policy. 
 
Price policy and import controls and 




Note: From 1955 the three Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) took a joint 
decision to harmonize their agricultural policies over a seven year period.  
Source: OEEC (1956, 1957 and 1958).  8
 
Other major influences over the years have been the great depression of the 1930s, 
when the agricultural sector in Europe really was down on its knees, and then of course 
the two world wars, with war economies and serious structural damage to the heartlands 
of Europe. For an overview of the impact of these events on agricultural policy in 
Europe, see Tracy (1976). The result was that the road chosen was paved with 
protection and price support, and subsequent events tells us that this path was hard to 
leave. 
  Even though it is not possible in this paper to give a full description of the 
foundation of the policy in all six countries, it is necessary to devote some space to a 
discussion of France. In the economic literature dealing with the creation of the CAP 
there is a strong consensus that France was the leading agricultural economic power in 
Europe at that time, and that France was 
the main driving force in the process of designing a common policy for agriculture
3. The 
latter has something to do with the power struggle between France and Germany. 
According to Grant (1997), it was in the interests of France to ensure that the German 
market was open to their agricultural products; only if this was possible would France 
open up its markets for industrial products from Germany (Grant, 1997 p, 63). In the 
1880s France decided to take the road of protection in order to defend its farmers from 
the influx of cheap overseas grain. According to Tracy (1982), agriculture in large parts 
of the French countryside in the latter part of nineteenth century was at the level of 
subsistence farming using traditional methods; there was low productivity and little 
contact with the market outside France. The rural population had a generally low level 
of education; there was widespread illiteracy, and standards of living were low (Tracy, 
1982 p. 66). In 1871 around 50 percent of the French labor force was employed in 
agriculture (O’Rourke, 1997 p. 792), and the industrial revolution in France, the start of 
which is generally dated to 1861, played no particular role for the agricultural sector at 
this time in history. There was only limited opportunity for the peasants to better their 
situation by migrating to the cities (Tracy, 1982 p. 67). The industrial sector had little 
use for cheap unskilled labor and had little to offer the farm sector in relation to 
technology. The case of France fits perfectly into the policy conclusions of O’Rourke 
mentioned above. The First World War had left France with major problems for the 
agricultural sector, due to damage to the land and the infrastructure. During the 1920s 
there was great discussion about the tariff policy established in the 1880s and the 
relationship of this to the needed kick start to the industrialization process, which was 
slow in France. The main farm organizations claimed that industrialization would mean 
low levels of protection for agriculture, and its consequent decline; and since agriculture 
was essential to France, its decline would mean the decline of the nation (Tracy, 1976 p. 
3).The French policy of protecting agriculture survived throughout the period until the 
creation of the CAP because of the great depression, World War Two and strong French 
farm fundamentalism in many circles. 
 
5. The economics of agricultural policy and the choice of policy regime 
As mentioned in the introduction, the five objectives of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (outlined in section 3) can be divided into two broad groups, concerned with 
production and income respectively. The first group includes productivity, market 
                                                           
35) Even though the Netherlands had a more market-oriented approach than the other five countries, they 
could not shift the official French viewpoint about the design of the CAP. If the UK had continued to play 
a role in the debate the Netherlands might have been able to play a different role in the process.  9
stabilization and the availability of supplies. The second group concerns ensuring a 
reasonable income for farmers on the one hand and a supply of food products for 
consumers at reasonable prices on the other. According to basic economic policy theory, 
two objectives demand two or more policy instruments. The Commission presented 
their ideal proposals for the CAP in 1960 in COM (60) 105 and in 1968 in COM (68) 
1000, and the two plans introduced price support and structural policy as the two major 
instruments of the CAP. The former was seen as the best solution to deal with the desire 
to increase agricultural production and stabilize markets, while the latter was seen as the 
best solution for increasing productivity and ensuring a reasonable level of income for 
farmers.  In the following, the alternative to price support, deficiency payments, will be 
compared with price support. The characteristics of both instruments are shown in 
figure 1. Both diagrams in figure 1 shows supply and demand curves for agricultural 
products in a net-importing country in a simple price/quantity framework. The initial 
point of departure is the price, p, which gives the supply qs and the demand qd. The 
distance between the two is the level of imports needed. Let us first consider the price 
support solution. 
 
    Price Support               
Deficiency Payments 
Figure 1: The effects of the implementation of price support and deficiency payments on the market for 
agricultural products in a large net-importing country.   
 
The government sets the institutional price p´ and that increases production to q´s and 
decreases demand to q´d. Another effect is a decrease in imports to the amount q´sq´d. 
In order to control this internal price independently of influence from the equilibrium 
price (world price), a system of trade barriers must also be implemented. In the case of 
deficiency payments, on the other hand, the government sets a target price p´at the level 
they want the farmer to receive for his products. This target price increases production to 
q´s. The equilibrium price, p, is still the market price, and consumers still buy qd. In this 
case there is a decrease in imports to the amount q´sqd. 
  Table 3 summarizes the welfare economic effects of the two instruments. In 
both cases the producers gain the same amount, the area A. In the situation with price 
support this gain is financed by the consumers, since they pay a higher price than the 
equilibrium price for their food products. The consumer loss is the area A+B+C+E. 
Because of the import levy the government gains C, and in a sense also the areas F and 
G, because the amount of (scarce)  foreign currency needed for imports decreases. The 
net loss, or the welfare economic loss, of implementing a price support policy is B+E. In 
the deficiency payments case the producers’ gain is paid by the taxpayers, because the 
difference between the target price and the equilibrium price is transferred directly to the 
farmers from the fiscal budget. The taxpayers’ loss is A+B. Again, the increase in 
production produces a decrease in the use of foreign currency due to a reduction in 
imports, in this case the area F. The welfare economic effect of implementing deficiency 
payments is B. Figure 1 does not show the effects of the internal policy on the world 
market, but because of the size of our country, the increase in production pushes the 
world market price down. In the first case this means that consumers have to pay a larger 
amount in price support; in the case of deficiency payments it actually means that 















transferred from the state to the farmer increases. Both instruments transfer money to 
agriculture and increase production. The main differences are the control of the market 
price in the price support regime and the type of financing. The choice of price support 
thus allows the CAP to help with respect to both the production objective and the 
income objective (at least in the short run). The financial aspect will be dealt with later, 
but it is clear that price support has the beneficial effect of creating revenue for the fiscal 
budget, while the effect of raising consumer prices causes a decline in demand for 
imports and thus brings about a greater increase in foreign currency reserves (F + G) 
than is the case with deficiency payments (F).  
 
Table 3. Welfare economic effects of the implementation of price support and deficiency payments on the 
market for agricultural products in a large net-importing country  












A + B 
Net Loss  B + E  B 
 
The second instrument of the Commission’s ideal CAP was structural policy aimed at 
reducing the quantity of farmers, land and cows. To understand the logic of the 
Commission’s proposals and the ability of this instrument to provide good income for 
farmers and increase productivity, it is necessary to study the economic background of 
the so-called income problem in agriculture, which was briefly touched upon in section 
1.The symptoms of the farm problem are, according to Schultz (1945), the low earnings 
of farm people relative to others in the economy, and the great instability of income from 
farming from year to year (Schultz, 1945).The farm problem is a very complex one. For 
economists, the problem concerns the misallocation of resources, or in other words the 
use of too many resources producing farm products relative to other goods and services. 
To the farmer, the problem is a paradox because, despite hard work and large capital 
investment, the result is a low and unstable income (Hathaway, 1963 p. 81). The 
agricultural market is characterized by inelastic supply and demand curves. The 
characteristics of the nature of the agricultural supply curve can be summerized in three 
points: first, the high degree of dependence of agricultural production on biological and 
climate-related factors (Johnson, 1950 and 1958); second, the organization and structure 
of farms that make agricultural supply fairly independent of variation in prices (Schultz, 
1945 and 1953) — the most important argument in this case being that the alternative 
use of the factors of production in agriculture is of little use elsewhere and therefore they 
have a high degree of fixity (Johnson, 1958)); and third, the influence of general 
developments in the overall economy and technology (Schultz, 1945; Cochrane, 1958), 
which leads to an increase in productivity and a worsening of the terms of trade for 
agriculture in response to economic growth. The inelastic nature of the demand curve is 
due to Engel’s law and the fact that food is a necessity good. 
  According to Cochrane (1958), the root of the problem is the long-run race 
between aggregated demand, driven by slow growth in population, and aggregated 
supply, driven by the implementation of new technology by farmers to lower total costs 
of production. Farmers implement new technology to reduce costs because the price is 
given, and therefore every time the price drops they implement new technology. The  11
farmer is thus trapped on a treadmill. Cochrane (1958) sees the implementation of 
technology as a dynamic process and therefore not all farmers benefit to the same degree 
from it. Those who hesitate are not able to maintain their income. In a world like this 
some farmers will always gain more money, the majority will maintain their status quo, 
and the laggard will lose money. On average, the overall income from agriculture will 
always be under pressure (Cochrane, 1958 pp. 85-107). 
  According to the old approaches to the farm problem, the solution to the income 
problem is structural policy measures that help the laggards to leave agriculture, 
combined with a market-oriented price support policy (Johnson, 1947; Cochrane, 1958). 
This can be achieved by means of early retirement schemes or by raising the farmers’ 
alternative value outside agriculture through education, and by providing job 
opportunities in the urban sector through macroeconomic policy in general. The 
proposals from the Commission in COM (68) 1000 fitted in perfectly with this idea. This 
view was also shared by the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) in two reports from 1961 and 1964, where structural policy measures to 
increase the mobility of factors of production in agriculture were recommended to solve 
the income problem (OECD, 1961 and 1964). As mentioned earlier, the political will 
among the ministers of agriculture in the six member countries to implement a common 
structural policy was lacking, due to the different approaches to structural policy 
(Fennell, 1997 pp. 38-39) mentioned in section 4. Another major factor in the rejection 
of a common structural policy was the financial aspect, because calculations showed that 
such a policy would have to be very costly if it were to succeed. The choice of price 
support without any kind of structural policy to ease adjustment is not a sound policy in 
the long run. Such a policy creates overproduction and brings no solution to the farm 
problem and hence none to the income problem. In more modern economic literature 
addressing the income problem, structural adjustment policy is seen as the only solution
4 
(Tweeten,1979 and1989; Gardner, 1987). 
  
Table 4. Implications of fiscal transfer to farmers in the EEC in 1967 if the EEC level of support was 
renationalized and changed from a price support regime to a direct support regime  
Agriculture´s share of 
GDP in billion US $ 
Tax revenue needed to 
finance fiscal transfers 



























































a) According to two studies, the amount of support in 1966/67 in the EEC was around 50 percent of the 
total value of agricultural production. 
Sources: Statistical Office of the European Communities (1970), OECD (2000b), Gulbrandsen & 
Lindbeck (1969) and Vandevalle & Meeusen (1971). 
 
Finally, let us consider discuss the choice of  price support as the main instrument of the 
                                                           
46) For an analysis of why key agricultural economists changed their policy recommendations for solving 
the farm problem see Gardner (1996).  12
CAP from the perceptive of the decision-makers in the EEC around 1960. In the light of  
the Commission’s proposals and the strong foundation of those proposals in agricultural 
economic literature, the question of why a price support mechanism was chosen is of 
considerable importance in the understanding of the Common Agricultural Policy. To 
answer this question we must consider the financing of the CAP, which operates through 
higher prices for agricultural products in the European market relative to the world 
market and a common EEC budget based on the principle of financial solidarity. The 
European economies had just recovered  from a long and turbulent period of depression 
and entered a period with prospects of high economic growth which were unique in 
history. Agriculture in the 1950s and in the beginning of the 1960s was still a major part 
of the general economy in Europe with respect to its share of GNP and employment (see 
table 1). The ideal working of the price and market policy and of the common budget 
was seen as being that in the beginning, when the EEC was a net importer of most 
agricultural products, the CAP would generate revenue for the budget and therefore be 
able to pay for export restitutions for products where the EEC was a net exporter. 
Empirical studies summarized in Neville-Rolfe (1973) indicate that by switching 
transfers to farmers from the national budget to the EEC budget, countries such as 
Germany and France saved money that could then be used in other sectors of the 
economy (Neville-Rolfe, 1973 pp. 21-22). 
  Another explanation of the choice of price support, based on the same line of 
argument, is a counterfactual one. If deficiency payments had been chosen  as the main 
instrument of the CAP, the fiscal transfers to farmers would have been large; this might 
have resulted in higher taxes that could have created distortions in the economies of the 
EEC countries and perhaps dampened the growth process. Both Gulbrandsen & 
Lindbeck (1969) and Vandevalle & Meeusen (1971) estimate the total transfers to EEC 
farmers in 1966/67 to be around 50 percent of the total value of production. In France 
the total value of agricultural production in 1967 was around US $ 8 billion. This means 
that the French government would have had to transfer US $ 4.1 billion from the fiscal 
budget to the farmers. This amount equals 4 percent of GNP in France in 1967, or in 
other words would have required an increase in the total French tax revenue of 11.9 
percent (Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1970 p.17; OECD, 2000b). 
Table 4 summarizes these counterfactual statistics for all EEC countries.  During the 
1960s, with high economic growth rates in Europe, the growth of wages in real terms 
more than offset the rising food prices due to the implementation of the CAP in the same 
period (Fennell, 1973 p. 6), and this helped to avoid the policy attracting public 
criticism.  The characteristics of the financial aspects of the CAP, together with the 
simplicity of the policy in regard to the low level of transaction costs needed to operate 
such a regime, must have made it easy for the decision-makers to reach an agreement.   
6. Conclusion             
The Common Agricultural Policy officially came into force on January, 1st 1958 as a 
part of the Treaty of Rome. The policy was actually implemented throughout the 1960s. 
Since then the CAP has been under pressure, for many reasons. The core of the criticism 
has often been centered around the choice of a price and market policy as the main 
instrument of the common policy. The conclusion of this paper is that viewed in both 
economic and historical perspectives, the choice of price support as the main policy 
instrument was a logical one. 
  The first argument for this is that the CAP was a result of the general economic 
integration in Europe rather than the reason for it. Even though talks on an integrated 
agricultural policy began in Europe just after the end of the Second World War and  13
continued for years, it was clear to decision-makers that it was going to be very difficult 
to reach any consensus about the design of a common policy. The Treaty of Rome was 
signed in late 1957 to ensure that the integration process would take place and also to 
ensure general political stability in the region. Article 39 stated the objectives of the 
CAP and article 43 placed responsibility for designing the actual policy with the 
Commission. The deadline was two years. This must have created some pressure on the 
Commission, and they therefore delivered their proposal in two stages. The first of these, 
put forward in 1960, presented a policy based on a price and market policy. This must 
have seemed fairly simple and straight-forward to the agricultural decision-makers of the 
day, and it was easy to find a consensus in favor. 
  The second argument is part of the former argument. The CAP was determined  
by the agricultural policies of the six founding countries. The historical foundation of 
these policies goes back to the influx of cheap overseas grain that flooded Western 
Europe in the 1880s. Other major influences over the years have been the great 
depression in the 1930s and the two world wars. The objectives of the agricultural policy 
in the six countries were very similar to those which later became the objectives of the 
CAP, in that they all considered production and income. The main type of farm in 
Europe after the Second World War was a fairly small-scale family-owned farm which 
had  structural problems to a greater or lesser extent. Increased production through 
increased productivity was seen as a solution to the farmers’ income problem. In all the 
six countries, a price policy combined with various structural policy measures had been 
chosen as the means to achieve this goal. The reasons for the differences in structural 
policy approaches were the different patterns of economic development among the six 
countries. 
  The third argument has to do with the financial aspects of a price and market 
policy in connection with a common budget. In the proposals for the CAP made around 
1960, it was easy for the politicians to see that the CAP would create revenue for the 
common budget through import levies as long as the EEC was a net importer of most 
agricultural products. It was also easy to see that the consumers would not create 
problems even though they were paying for it all, because it was believed that the 
economic growth would generate growth in income in real terms in the implementation 
period of the CAP that would offset the food price increases. The alternative to price 
support would have been deficiency payments, and had that instrument been chosen it 
would have dampened economic growth because of the distortions created by taxes 
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